

DDI BRIEFING NOTES

20 June 1967

SOVIET UNION

Military

USSR, with highest military expenditures of post-war period, engaged in dynamic R&D program in search of some breakthrough which might alter balance of power in Soviet favor.

No breakthrough in evidence, but across-the-board offensive and defensive improvement is giving Sovs growing confidence they have an assured destruction capability which can inflict severe losses on people and resources of United States.

We don't think Soviets--even in next 10 years--will consider themselves strong enough to sit down and consider initiating a global thermonuclear exchange with U. S.; nevertheless, the more confidence they have, the closer they will be willing to go to brink.

They are now engaged in deploying a third generation of hardened, dispersed ~~SS~~ ICBM's which could put them close to numerical equality in launchers (excluding Polaris) in 1971.

224 1st- and 2nd-generation
ca.500 SS-11 completed or under construction.
ca.180 SS-9 " " " "
ca. 900 operational in mid-1969.

SS-11 is "city-buster" rather than big pinpoint weapon for knocking out hardened targets.

Anti-ballistic missile system is being deployed, but only around Moscow;

STAT

Other system (TALLINN) being deployed to some [redacted]
sites so far across USSR, [redacted]

25X1
25X1

[redacted] looks more like long-range SAM.

Military improvement is general: new fighters,
new Polaris-type nuclear subs, new tactical rockets
and artillery, even two new helicopter carriers, either
for assault or ASW.

Military leaders are not giving up their priority
on critical resources; one result is continuing
inability of USSR to put the necessary effort into the
overall economy to regain the growth rate of the 1950's.

Political:

Men who ousted Khrushchev have evolved a system of
collective decision-making which has worked so far by
ducking or postponing the hard decisions, resisting
major departures. No evidence yet that the existing
machinery can take the hard decisions in its stride or
overcome natural drift toward one-man rule. Brezhnev
is at least first among equals, with indications that
struggle for power, factionalism, continues behind scenes.

Foreign Policy

We believe the low-key style of the present leadership
is better suited to present circumstances than Khrushchev's,
and continues Cold War in more subtle, more gradual, more
effective manner. Long-range goals remain the same.

On Vietnam, Soviets probably (1) sincerely feel they
must support fellow-Communists against U.S. imperialists;

(2) Approved For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00827A000900120001-5 that

USSR is collaborating with US to sell out the Vietnamese; and (3) are probably delighted to see large portion of U.S. strength tied down in Far East.

But they have indicated in a number of ways that they do not want a showdown with U.S. over Vietnam at expense of more vital Soviet interests--e.g., Europe, disarmament, trade,--for which they must keep their lines to Washington open and available.

Sino-Soviet Dispute

The Sino-Soviet dispute is real, not phoney, and their relations are presently at rock-bottom. We do not see any prospect for improvement in their relations short of a major change in leadership in either Moscow or Peking. Brezhnev, Kosygin & Co. have maneuvered their way out of the impasse in which Khrushchev's blunt tactics left them, now have China almost completely isolated in the Communist world.

Each country is concentrating on building a record to blame the other for a final rupture of relations if and when it comes, largely on the issue of support for Vietnam. Soviet aid at present goes almost entirely overland as far as military hardware is concerned. Chinese would probably like to confront Soviets with necessity of sea shipment, figuring Moscow will not risk confrontation with U.S. Navy off Haiphong, Peking could then accuse Soviets of cowardice.

COMMUNIST CHINA

In China, the "Cultural Revolution" is now almost a year old, has riddled-the leadership, implanted lasting suspicions and fears among the survivors, cut back the economy. It has settled into alternating periods of renewed drives by Mao and Lin Piao against their enemies in the party leadership, and periods of relative "moderation" when authority has to be turned over to Chou En-lai, speaking for the government machinery and backed by the army, to restore some semblance of order and authority over the provinces. Army has proven less than monolithic in loyalty to Lin Piao, seems to back Chou in disciplining the Red Guards whenever it appears the controls are set at "moderation."

Of 25 men in new Politburo last August, only four other than Mao, Lin and Chou are untouched by purge today. This tends to discourage any new policy lines, may also deter foreign adventures. But whoever wins out, we do not expect any reduction in hostility to U.S.

Military

When Soviets discontinued aid in 1960, Communist China was left with conventional armed forces which amounted to an airforce inferior in quality to ChiNats and rapidly becoming obsolescent, a navy capable of nothing more than coast defense, a sub-standard World War II army. Its strength lay in numbers--2,300,000 in army, capable of overrunning any mainland neighbor, Russia excepted, but only in absence of significant opposition from a major power.

Over the past three years, however, Chinese Communists have more than made up for loss of Soviet help, emerged with own family of advanced weapons, entirely on their own.

CHIC-6 shows they can package thermonuclear weapon for delivery by their handful of aging medium bombers, or by surface-to-surface missile as in CHIC-4. We believe they can begin deploying operational nuclear MRBM this year. 1,000-n.m. missile can threaten all of Japan and Philippines, a good share of Indonesia, all of Southeast and South Asia, and eastern and southern USSR as far as Caspian.

We believe they could deploy their first crude ICBMs in the early 1970's.

They have turned out enough Chinese copies of MIG-19 (capacity at least 20 per month) so they could spare some for Pakistan; we expect they may soon begin producing their own versions of MIG-21 and BADGER jet medium bomber.

They have put together one copy of a Soviet submarine which can launch three 350-mile ballistic missiles, but we do not have any indications that they have produced a missile for this system yet.

Communist China is thus driving, with an overriding priority which leaves the rest of the economy virtually stagnant, for status as a major military power.

Despite all the belligerent talk about support for Hanoi, however, we think there are probably only three circumstances in which the Chinese would feel obliged to intervene there with this growing military capability:

- 1) U.S. air strikes against China
- 2) A major U.S. invasion of North Vietnam
- 3) Imminent collapse of North Vietnamese government.

-----This, of course, postulates a rational assessment of Chinese interests, a shaky assumption in Mao's current condition.

VIETNAM

Since American combat troops went in ^(to Vietnam) in middle of 1965,

--we have taken initiative away from Communists as far as main combat forces are concerned

--we have prevented them from massing to launch an offensive

--we have inflicted heavy casualties: 1966, 56,000 Communists KIA, 20,000 defected.

Yet current Order of Battle credits enemy with more men than ever: more than 300,000, including 141,170 *main force* operating under eight division headquarters, with 22 North Vietnamese and 12 Viet Cong regiments.

Indications are that Communist command--exercised almost completely by identified North Vietnamese generals--has decided it is too costly as a general rule to fight major military engagements against superior allied fire power and close air support.

But--as they have around DMZ--they will still put together major concentrations whenever they feel that the target, the

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weather, the strategic/tactical situation, or our own dispositions justify the risk.

Otherwise, they will re-emphasize classic guerrilla warfare--and in particular they will probably try to concentrate on smashing the pacification elements. Security for the job of the rural development teams is becoming a full-time job for the South Vietnamese Army.

One general summary can be applied to the fighting, the pacification, and the political situation in South Vietnam. There are encouraging aspects, but there are no easy solutions, and there is a long, long way to go.

As for negotiation prospects, Hanoi still takes the basic stand that we must cease all bombing in order to find out what their answer may be, and their leading spokesmen still insist that any settlement must be on the basis of Hanoi's Four Points, which stipulate the withdrawal of all U.S. forces, and a voice for the NFL in the government of South Vietnam.

As far as we can tell, Hanoi probably recognizes that it cannot win in the South by force of arms or by terrorism, but is counting on war-weariness in the U.S., and the pressure of world public opinion, to take the U.S. out of the war.

THAILAND

Thailand is paying for its pro-Western stance by increasing incidence of guerrilla warfare--now running about an incident a day, and widespread.

they believe they have started suppressive operations and civic action early enough to handle the job themselves with no more help from us than occasional helicopter lift. They may be right, but there are many remote regions where there is little government presence, little government loyalty. Guerrillas do not get much support from the people, * but they are getting increasing support from China and North Vietnam.

LAOS

The fighting in Laos doesn't hit the headlines, but it continues: more than 1,600 engagements in 1966. RLG and Meo guerrillas make a little headway in rainy season, lose it again to North Vietnamese in dry season. There are some ¹⁸ 15,000 North Vietnamese troops--plus or minus depending on season--in Laos, holding half the country, Main task is to hold and operate Ho Chi Minh corridor.

CAMBODIA

Prince Sihanouk believes that over the long run the Communists--and Peking in particular--are going to dominate Southeast Asia. His main aim therefore is to take out insurance both for his own future and that of his country. He has recently obtained assurances from the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong that they will respect the integrity of Cambodia within the borders claimed by Cambodia.

Sihanouk's thinking is also conditioned by historic hostility between Cambodia on one hand, Thailand and Vietnam on other, and exile operations against him alternately supported and tolerated by Saigon and Bangkok.

Sihanouk considers both Thailand and South Vietnam under U.S. control, and therefore blames U.S. for their actions and attitudes.

Evidence is that Sihanouk is opposed to Viet Cong operational use of Cambodian territory for refuge, regrouping, and logistics, but he does not have control over much of the border area and is powerless to prevent violations.

INDONESIA

Until recently, 100,000,000 Indonesians, with extensive potential resources and important strategic geography, were sliding surely into grasp of Peking, thanks to a strong Communist party tolerated by Sukarno out of his conviction Chinese Communism was wave of future.

Badly timed, bungled, and unnecessary coup attempt gave army leaders a chance to turn the tables. Today Indonesian Communists are shattered, and General Suharto has almost completed delicate and time-consuming job of taking away all of Sukarno's power.

But Indonesia is to all intents and purposes bankrupt and prostrate economically. It owes more than \$2.5 billion, East and West. Just to put economy on a survival basis will take years of careful planning, tight control, international cooperation on re-skedding debts, and heavy infusions of financial help.

INDIA

Congress Party down to thinnest parliamentary edge since independence; majority control in only 8 of 17 state governments.

Continuing drought, inability to raise agricultural production, mean India will need massive food imports for at least next several years. (Suez closure, Calcutta disorders may combine to produce actual famine conditions temporarily in scattered localities in immediate future.)

Externally, apprehensive re Chinese on Himalayan frontier, no progress toward solution of Kashmir and other disputes with Pakistan.

PAKISTAN

Ayoub, since he dismissed his pro-Peking Foreign Minister, has made a few limited moves to repair his relations with U.S., but they will remain conditioned by Pakistani view that we left them down during fighting with India.

IRAN

The Shah of Iran was also shaken by the way arms aid to Pakistan was cut off during the Kashmir fighting. He is convinced that Nasir and radical Arab States have designs on Iran around the Persian Gulf, and has been wondering if he, too, shouldn't diversify his arms sources.

As a result, he arranged a deal for about \$110 million in military hardware from the Soviet Union, and expanded economic relations with the Communist Bloc as well.

The Shah is reported to be "ecstatic" over reports that the international oil consortium working Iranian fields, moving to meet Middle Eastern disruptions, plans to increase Iranian production by 27 percent. Actually, an increase of that size is probably beyond the capability of Iranian facilities, and the Shah will wind up being disappointed now matter how substantial the increase is.

Iran has ~~is~~ worked out a long-term deal under which the Soviet Union is to build pipelines for natural gas now being burned off at Iranian wells; the pipelines are to be paid for by export of natural gas, which is also to finance a list of industrial aid projects.

TURKEY

Pakistan, Iran and Turkey form the so-called "Northern Tier," which--first in Baghdad Pact and then in CENTO--~~was~~ ^{was supposed} to screen the turbulent Middle East from the Communist bloc. Like Pakistan and Iran, however, Turkey is also seeking to improve relations with the Communists in an effort to achieve more leverage and greater independence.

In Turkey's case, Cyprus plays the role Kashmir does for Pakistan--U.S. is damned if it does, damned if it doesn't. Ever since U.S. moved to head off a Greek-Turkish military showdown over Cyprus, our relations with Ankara have been in trouble.

- 1) Turkey has required an extensive review of practically all our bilateral agreements.

- 2) Turks have been increasingly sensitive and negative on operations likely to irk Soviets---

[redacted] Black Sea naval visits, joint maneuvers, etc. 25X1


- 3) Violent left-wing anti-American propaganda, sporadically inflamed to mob violence by Turkish extremists, is tolerated by government. 25X1



- 5) Kosygin got cool public reception on his recent state visit to Turkey, ^{early this year} but it was the first time a Soviet premier had ever visited Turkey.

CYPRUS

The Cyprus issue appears to be as far from solution as ever. Quiet Greek-Turkish talks have made some headway from time to time, but they have broken down repeatedly because of Greek government crises which justified Turkish doubts that the Greek negotiator could speak for Greece, let alone sell any agreement to Archbishop Makarios. Makarios for his part tries to undermine any possible Greek-Turkish solution, is trying to develop his own forces independent of Greek command, with weapons from Czechoslovakia. 25X1



25X1

GREECE

Greece itself is the western terminus of the disruption that plagues what was supposed to be the strong NATO-CENTO-SEATO cordon stretched along the periphery of the Soviet Bloc. It is clear that the men who made the April 21 coup moved without the foreknowledge or consent of the King or the top military commanders. It is equally true that the coup probably was the only means of forestalling election victory by political elements likely to be non-aligned or neutralist in sentiment at best, pro-Communist at worst, and opposed to the Monarchy and hence to stability.

But it is difficult to see how or when the present regime is going to restore democracy and at the same time preclude a return to that same political threat, given the popular support for the forces around the Papandreous.

THE MIDDLE EAST

We are in for a protracted period of impasse, tension and crisis in the Middle East. For the moment at least, the total Arab defeat and resultant bitterness appears to have strengthened rather than weakened the leadership of Nasir and the other radicals--and left the principal moderate, King Husayn ^{of} ~~and~~ Jordan, in the shakiest position of all.

- 1) Arabs, buoyed by Soviet propaganda, still refuse to accept existence of Israel.
- 2) They count on pressures exerted through control of oil facilities, closure of Suez.

25X6

Soviets can replace aircraft, and in time tanks,



25X6

Israelis, on other hand

- 1) appear determined to hang onto what they have taken, regardless of world pressures, until Arabs come to conference table and work out a more permanent modus vivendi than a mere cease-fire or armistice.

25X6

U.S. will find that





Other pressures for settlement:

- 1) Continued Israeli mobilization disrupts economy; so far they have demobilized one-third to one-fourth of total strength.
- 2) Egypt loses about \$20 million a month in Canal revenue, about \$10 million a month in tourism, Sinai oil.

25X6

Yemen

In the Yemen, the Egyptians have pulled out enough strength so that the Royalists and supporting tribes, 

 are likely to resume their offensive. They

25X6

have been held in check only by Egyptian presence

25X6

AFRICA

Two main factors affecting events in Africa:

A) The "White Redoubt"--Republic of South Africa, Portuguese Africa, Rhodesia. Determined to hang on, will not be brought down by sanctions.

B) The thin veneer of leadership in newly independent African countries. Barely enough in most countries to afford a workable government and opposition; remove it and there's nothing left but chaos.

Soviet-Chinese Rivalry

Emerging Africa is a battleground in Sino-Soviet dispute, but this rarely offers any benefit to us. Communists have extensive presence in Tanzania, Somalia, Mali, Guinea, former French Congo, and Algeria in North.

Nigeria

Nigeria, most populous country (50 million) is falling

apart without any need for Communist manipulations. British left Nigeria with possibly strongest hope in Africa for stable, intelligent government, economic viability, but it has been pulled apart by tribal and ^{religious} ~~confessional~~ differences. There are more than 200 separate tribal groupings in Nigeria among the major divisions into Moslem Haussas in the North, Christian Ibos in East, pagan Yorubas in West. Ibos are most advanced, best trained, have oil, but are badly outnumbered, bitterly resented.

North Africa

North Africa is affected by the division of new African states into radicals and moderates. This rivalry, along with border issues, occasionally brings Algeria close to hostilities with Morocco, and to a lesser extent Tunisia. Algeria receives extensive arms aid from USSR.

The Horn

In the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia has been a force for stability and moderation, but the Emperor is aging, and the succession outlook offers little prospect for continued stability. Ethiopia is plagued by internal dissidence in Eritrea, border warfare with Somalia.

The Somalis are similarly keeping the border with Kenya in a state of unrest, claiming large Somali tribal areas in both Kenya and Ethiopia should be part of Somalia.

Just to keep entire area in a state of unrest, the

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in the Negro South bordering on civil war.

EUROPE

Europe is neither a police state nor a denied area, and there are few major issues that you cannot explore at length in the overt information media, so our time is probably better spent on other areas.

LATIN AMERICA

In Latin America, dominant factor is Cuba--not as direct threat to U.S., but as locus of infection for the rest of Latin America

Soviets have given Cuba strongest military establishment in Latin America.

--Considerable shipping increase over past 10 months, but this is replacement, resupply, not major new weapons.

--Our constant watch by all available intelligence methods and sources remains negative on strategic offensive weapons in Cuba, but we cannot be positive in absence of on-site inspection.

Soviets in 1964 got Castro agreement to work only through orthodox Communists.

Castro fears his revolution will lose its dynamism if other Latinos don't follow suit. He has renounced the 1964 agreement, openly accuses Moscow of betraying Communism by maintaining or improving relations with LA countries where guerrillas are in the field.

He is working with militant Communist or other left-wing extremist factions to maintain and expand insurgency in

Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala, and Bolivia, often over the violent protests of the orthodox Communist parties in those countries.

Castro, March 13 speech:

"If, in any nation, those who call themselves Communists do not know how to fulfill their duties, we will support those who behave like real Communists in the struggle, even though they do not call themselves Communists."

Havana broadcasts about 175 hours a week to Latin America and affords guerrilla training to left extremists of varying affiliations, in order to develop the basis for guerrilla warfare in countries at present free from insurgency.

Where there is active insurgency, Cuba will provide funds, propaganda support, training, and on occasion weapons and even leadership.

Venezuela

Venezuela has taken its case against Cuban instigation of insurgency to the O.A.S., inflamed by the latest incident on May 8th when Venezuelan guerrillas escorted by Cuban military personnel were intercepted while attempting to infiltrate with weapons and cash.

There are two guerrilla groups in the field in Venezuela, one headed by dissident Communist Douglas Bravo, the other representing the M.I.R., or Movement of the Revolutionary Left. MIR leader Americo Martin was recently

Bravo operated at times from a sanctuary in the University of Caracas until the government suspended academic autonomy and moved in to clean up the campus. The University had also been a major base and sanctuary for urban terrorists.

Colombia

There are also two guerrilla groups in the field in Colombia. The Army of National Liberation, a purely Cuban creation, operates north of Bogota in the Santander area, raiding towns and police stations, robbing banks, occasionally attacking trains.

The F.A.R.C., or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, operate in the mountains south of Bogota, where the Colombian Communist Party over the years established sufficient leadership over the perennial banditry of the area so that half a dozen areas came to be known as Communist enclaves.

The Colombian military has made some inroads in these areas by a combination of counter-insurgency operations and civic action, but in many remote areas the government presence is virtually non-existent.

Guatemala

Cuba has been giving assistance and guidance to Guatemalan guerrilla and terrorist groups for more than three years. Initially this aid went mainly to the ^{left-}~~xxx~~-extremist "13th of November" group of Yon Sosa.

More recently, Cuba has confined its aid to the F.A.R., the military arm of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist Party.

At the same time it has been backing F.A.R. militants against old-guard moderates within the orthodox leadership who question whether open insurgency offers the best path to power in Guatemala.

Bolivia

Early this year, guerrilla warfare broke out in the mountainous southeastern area of Bolivia. Evidence indicates that there is a force of about 60 well-trained, well-equipped guerrillas, including some Cubans and other Latin American nationals. So far, the army has been unable to suppress the guerrillas, and President Barrientos apparently believes the job cannot be done without outside help. He has asked U.S. for more military equipment, more training, more support generally.

Long-range plan is to complete training of a special counter-insurgency unit which would then be deployed to suppress the guerrillas, but this will take time.

Danger is that meanwhile (a) another reported guerrilla grouping in north may begin activities (b) students and dynamite-wielding tin miners may reinforce the southeastern guerrillas.

Barrientos lacks the broad political support base to ride out and surmount such challenges.

Other Guerrilla Potential

Guerrilla potential also exists in Panama, Ecuador, Peru Brazil, Dominican Republic. So far, however, nothing significant has developed.

Panama, because of Canal and US presence, high on Castro's priority list. About 150 Panamanians, mainly students, have been trained in party activities or guerrilla warfare, sabotage, in Cuba, USSR, Communist China.

Ecuador's long history of political instability should afford fertile ground for insurgency, but apparently the various would-be insurgency groups suffer just as much from ~~the~~ perpetual disorganization, factionalism, and poor leadership as the rest of the Ecuadoran body politic.

In Peru, Castro's assets for insurgency were severely set back by government's suppression of guerrilla activity in June, 1965. Leaders are dead, in jail, or in exile, but Cubans are working to reorganize remnants and reestablish funding and communication channels.

25X1

Limited number of Dominicans, mainly from leftist "14th of June" movement, and Communist Dominican Popular

Movement, have been getting Cuban political and

paramilitary training. Government security forces have recently picked up a number of Cuban agents in Dom.Rep., and have cracked down on several apparent efforts by MR14J groups to take to the hills and launch new guerrilla warfare.

--Danger of guerrilla warfare in Dom.Rep. is secondary at present, however, to the question of whether Balaguer can maintain a sufficiently viable working relationship with the military, the conservatives, and the moderate leftist forces to prevent a new polarization of Dominican political forces and give the democratic process a chance to work.

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ILLEGIB

